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GARBAGE IN, GARBAGE OUT:
REVISING STRICKLAND AS APPLIED TO
FORENSIC SCIENCE EVIDENCE
Mark Loudon-Brown*
INTRODUCTION
As a public defender some years ago, I tried a case in which the
prosecution sought to admit the results produced by a software
program called the Forensic Statistical Tool, or “FST.”1 At the time,
FST had recently been developed and put into use by the Office of
the Chief Medical Examiner (OCME) of New York City to analyze
mixtures of DNA recovered from potentially incriminating evidence.2
It was a new program, novel by my estimation, so I filed a motion
requesting a Frye3 hearing to challenge the admissibility of the
incriminating results produced by the software. The motion spanned
some thirty pages, complete with exhibits that included various
laboratory reports and articles regarding the OCME’s proffered
validation studies. I handed a courtesy copy of the relatively bulky
motion to the judge one morning at the beginning of court. He denied
the request without so much as turning the first page.
Unfortunately, this type of judicial reaction to an admissibility
challenge is not uncommon. Judges routinely overrule admissibility
challenges, as if to say, “once admissible, always admissible.” As one
practitioner has observed, “Even when the most vulnerable forensic
sciences—hair microscopy, bite marks, and handwriting—are
attacked, the courts routinely affirm admissibility citing earlier
* Senior Attorney, Southern Center for Human Rights. Many thanks to Patrick Mulvaney, Managing
Attorney of the Capital Litigation Unit at the Southern Center for Human Rights, for discussing ideas
and reading drafts.
1. The record of the case has since been sealed, so all identifying information has been withheld.
2. For a more detailed discussion of the FST software, see People v. Collins, 15 N.Y.S.3d 564, 567,
577–82 (Sup. Ct. 2015). There the court found that the results produced by the FST software did not
meet the Frye test. Id. at 587.
3. See Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923). The case was tried in the Bronx, New
York, which is a Frye jurisdiction.
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decisions rather than facts established at a hearing.”4 A prominent
federal judge and law school dean concurred in a piece that they
coauthored:
[J]udges frequently rely on the experience of a forensic
practitioner, and the long-standing use of a given technique,
rather than focusing on the technique’s scientific
validity. . . . Therefore, even as many judges have come to
recognize the weak scientific underpinnings of some
methods, they continue to allow such testimony primarily
because nearly all other judges have done so before.5
If sophisticated-sounding scientific evidence is an undesirable
subject matter for a judge to tackle anew, it can be even more
daunting for a defense attorney to confront, particularly one faced
with a crushing caseload. It can be tempting to avoid a challenge to a
vulnerable forensic science discipline—be it new, novel, or simply
recently called into question—when the lawyer reasonably believes
that the evidence will be admitted regardless.6 Worse still, it may
seem reasonable to disregard any adversarial challenge to
incriminatory science altogether, and to opt instead for a different
defense or to encourage a guilty plea. With hundreds of other clients
to assist, why invest the time and resources needed to comprehend a
new scientific technique sufficiently to cross-examine an expert who
has dedicated his or her career to learning the field?7 It is an
4. Peter J. Neufeld, The (Near) Irrelevance of Daubert to Criminal Justice and Some Suggestions
for Reform, 95 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH S107, S110 (2005); see also Hon. Alex Kozinski, Criminal Law
2.0, 44 GEO. L.J. ANN. REV. CRIM. PROC. III, at XXXV (2015) (“Few defense lawyers challenge the
reliability of expert evidence because few trial judges grant requests for Daubert hearings.”).
5. Harry T. Edwards & Jennifer L. Mnookin, A Wake-Up Call on the Junk Science Infesting Our
Courtrooms, WASH. POST (Sept. 20, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/a-wake-up-callon-the-junk-science-infesting-our-courtrooms/2016/09/19/85b6eb22-7e90-11e6-8d13d7c704ef9fd9_story.html?utm_term=.833de5d38ced [http://perma.cc/BT3C-KJHC].
6. If this decision seems reasonable to the defense attorney, all the more reasonable it will look to a
court of review searching for reasons to affirm a conviction.
7. See Neufeld, supra note 4 (“Unlike the extremely well-litigated civil challenges, the criminal
defendant’s challenge is usually perfunctory. . . . Defense lawyers generally fail to build a challenge
with appropriate witnesses and new data. Thus, even if inclined to mount a Daubert challenge, they lack
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intimidating endeavor. Defense challenges to forensic evidence,
therefore, are often inconsequential at best or incompetent at worst.8
The appellate courts have not rectified this situation or the
incentives it engenders. Admissibility decisions are reviewed for
abuse of discretion.9 Claims of ineffective assistance of counsel
(IAC) succeed only upon satisfaction of the highly deferential twopronged standard announced in Strickland v. Washington.10 As one
solution, I propose that when it comes to the admission of forensic
science evidence against a criminal defendant at trial, the Strickland
standard should be altered.
Once a reviewing court finds that an attorney performed
deficiently in combating incriminating forensic science evidence,
Strickland prejudice should be presumed. In other words, if a
reviewing court has determined that trial counsel was deficient in his
or her adversarial testing of incriminating forensic evidence, that
court must reverse the conviction and order a new trial, lest
defendants be deprived of their Sixth Amendment right to effective
assistance of counsel and the integrity of convictions founded on
forensic evidence be left in doubt. It should not matter whether, in the
opinion of a court reading a cold record that was deficiently
developed as far as the forensic science is concerned, the defendant
was prejudiced by the deficiency.
A few benefits would flow from this revision. First, rather than
allowing courts to bypass the deficiency prong in favor of finding no
prejudice, the revision would require courts to address the deficiency
question when incriminating forensic science evidence is at issue—if
the court finds defense counsel’s assistance sufficient, the inquiry

the requisite knowledge and skills, as well as the funds, to succeed.”).
8. Id.
9. Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 139 (1997). One former federal judge has suggested that
this standard of review change. Kozinski, supra note 4, at xxxv. “Failure to hold a Daubert hearing
where the reliability of expert evidence has been credibly challenged should be considered an error of
law, as should the refusal to allow a defense memory expert where the case turns on conflicting
recollections of past events.” Id.
10. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). The two prongs are (1) deficient
performance and (2) prejudice to the defense. Id.
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ends; if not, the court, in reversing, thereby reiterates citable
standards for defense counsel going forward. This, in turn, would act
as an enforcement mechanism to ensure that the criminal defense bar
performs consistently with what is constitutionally required of it in
the future.
Second, presuming prejudice in the forensic science IAC context
will more properly police trial courts that are inclined to treat
challenges to forensic evidence hastily and help ensure the integrity
of convictions based on forensic science. Rather than asking courts to
undertake the nigh impossible task of deciphering how an effective
challenge to sophisticated scientific evidence could hypothetically
have altered the outcome of a case, the law would ensure that the
science is effectively challenged in the first place.
I. The Foundation to Alter Strickland
In 1984, the United States Supreme Court, in Strickland v.
Washington, held that to succeed on a claim of ineffective assistance
of counsel, a defendant must show that his or her counsel’s
performance was deficient and that the deficiency prejudiced the
defense.11 The defendant must demonstrate both prongs; so,
reviewing courts are permitted to skip right to the prejudice prong
and find against a defendant on prejudice grounds, even if defense
counsel was deficient.12 In fact, the Strickland Court actually
encouraged reviewing courts to bypass the deficiency prong if the
prejudice prong is dispositive:
[A] court need not determine whether counsel’s
performance was deficient before examining the prejudice
suffered by the defendant as a result of the alleged
deficiencies. The object of an ineffectiveness claim is not to
grade counsel’s performance. If it is easier to dispose of an
ineffectiveness claim on the ground of lack of sufficient
11. Id.
12. Id. at 697.
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prejudice, which we expect will often be so, that course
should be followed. Courts should strive to ensure that
ineffectiveness claims not become so burdensome to
defense counsel that the entire criminal justice system
suffers as a result.13
By only engaging in a prejudice analysis and bypassing the
deficiency question, as courts are wont to do under Strickland,14
reviewing courts neglect their duty to ensure the integrity of
convictions based on forensic science evidence and to ensure the
constitutional guarantee of effective assistance of counsel in such
cases.

13. Id.
14. For example, concurring in the judgment in Harrington v. Richter, Justice Ginsburg agreed that
by “failing even to consult blood experts in preparation for the murder trial,” trial counsel did not
function as the “counsel” envisioned by the Sixth Amendment. 562 U.S. 86, 113 (2011) (Ginsburg, J.,
concurring). Nevertheless, Justice Ginsburg did not believe the “strong force of the prosecution’s case”
was reduced sufficiently to warrant relief. Id. at 113–14 (Ginsburg, J., concurring). See also, e.g., Ellis
v. Raemisch, 872 F.3d 1064, 1090 (10th Cir. 2017) (“[W]e have yet another reason for concluding that
Mr. Ellis has failed to establish prejudice related to Mr. Stayton’s decision (assumed to be erroneous) for
failing to consult and/or call as an expert witness Dr. Long.”); Friedlander v. United States, 570 F.
App’x 883, 887 (11th Cir. 2014) (“Because we conclude that Dr. Friedlander has failed to satisfy the
prejudice prong of Strickland with respect to the ineffective assistance of counsel claims contained in
the certificate of appealability, we affirm the denial of his motion to vacate.”); Schlesinger v. United
States, 898 F. Supp. 2d 489, 499 (E.D.N.Y. 2012) (“[A] Court need not examine a petitioner’s claims
under both prongs of the Strickland analysis if those claims are plainly deficient under either one. In this
case, the petitioner’s claims of ineffective assistance of counsel fail in the absence of demonstrable
prejudice.”); Duronio v. United States, No. 10-1574 (JLL), 2012 WL 78201, at *3 (D. N.J. Jan. 10,
2012) (“With this framework in mind, the Court now turns to Petitioner’s arguments and will first
address whether Petitioner set forth facts to support the arguments that he suffered prejudice as a result
of Mr. Adams’s alleged deficiencies.”); Redmon v. Johnson, No. S16H1197, 2018 WL 415714, at *3
(Ga. Jan. 16, 2018) (per curiam) (noting that where a habeas court incorrectly rules that counsel was not
deficient, if the appellate court finds no prejudice, “an appeal would result in affirming the habeas
court’s judgment”); Hodges v. State, 213 So.3d 863, 874 (Fla. 2017) (“In light of the totality of the
evidence, we affirm the trial court’s denial of relief on the ground that there is no reasonable probability
that more thorough preparation by trial counsel through consultation with experts would have made any
difference to the outcome of the trial.”); Lupoe v. State, 794 S.E.2d 67, 77 (Ga. 2016) (“[A]ssuming,
without deciding, that a timely special demurrer would have had merit and that trial counsel performed
deficiently rather than strategically in failing to file one, Lupoe has not shown prejudice.”); People v.
Snell, No. 2-08-0949, 2011 WL 10088352, at *12 (Ill. App. Ct. Jan. 21, 2011) (“Defendant’s argument
that expert testimony regarding shaken baby syndrome should have been subjected to a Frye hearing
lacks merit, and defendant, therefore, cannot establish prejudice.”).
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Today, almost thirty-four years later, the Strickland standard still
governs. Yet the Strickland Court articulated the standard before the
advent of forensic DNA testing, before the emergence of
electronically stored information as evidence in a criminal case, and
years before disciplines long believed reliable—such as fingerprint,
hair, toolmark, bitemark, and fire analysis, and even Shaken Baby
Syndrome—were exposed as fraught with error.15 In a
groundbreaking report issued in 2009, the National Research Council
of the National Academies found that “no forensic method other than
nuclear DNA analysis has been rigorously shown to have the
capacity to consistently and with a high degree of certainty support
conclusions about ‘individualization’ (more commonly known as
‘matching’ of an unknown item of evidence to a specific known
source).”16 Since Strickland, the law governing the admissibility of
forensic evidence has evolved,17 but Strickland has not.
In other contexts, however, the IAC inquiry operates differently.
The Supreme Court has recognized that prejudice should be
presumed,18 or the prejudice standard lowered,19 when addressing
certain types of ineffectiveness claims. In Powell v. Alabama, the
Court found that the defendant was denied effective assistance of
counsel after his counsel was rushed to trial without time to prepare a
defense in a publicized case, which deprived the defendant of “the
right of counsel in any substantial sense.”20 Under those
circumstances, “[n]either [counsel] nor the court could say what a
prompt and thorough-going investigation might disclose as to the
15. PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL OF ADVISORS ON SCI. AND TECH., FORENSIC SCIENCE IN CRIMINAL
COURTS: ENSURING SCIENTIFIC VALIDITY OF FEATURE-COMPARISON METHODS 23 (2016) [hereinafter
PCAST Report].
16. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NAT’L ACADS., STRENGTHENING FORENSIC SCIENCE IN THE
UNITED STATES: A PATH FORWARD 87 (2009) [hereinafter NAS Report]. A subsequent report in 2016
concluded that “many forensic feature-comparison methods have historically been assumed rather than
established to be foundationally valid based on appropriate empirical evidence.” PCAST Report, supra
note 15, at 122 (emphasis in original).
17. See, e.g., Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 141–42 (1999) (extending Daubert);
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 589–90 (1993) (altering the Frye test).
18. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 58, 73 (1932).
19. Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 349–50 (1980).
20. Powell, 287 U.S. at 58.
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facts.”21 Accordingly, prejudice was presumed, and the conviction
was reversed.22
Later, in Cuyler v. Sullivan, the Supreme Court held that to
establish a Sixth Amendment violation based on the claim that the
defendant’s attorney was laboring under an actual conflict of interest,
the defendant must show that the lawyer’s performance was
adversely affected.23 “Thus, a defendant who shows that a conflict of
interest actually affected the adequacy of his representation need not
demonstrate prejudice in order to obtain relief.”24 In so holding, the
Cuyler Court referred to Glasser v. United States,25 where the
Supreme Court observed that, “[t]o determine the precise degree of
prejudice sustained . . . is at once difficult and unnecessary. The right
to have the assistance of counsel is too fundamental and absolute to
allow courts to indulge in nice calculations as to the amount of
prejudice arising from its denial.”26
Then, in United States v. Cronic,27 decided the same day as
Strickland, the Supreme Court reiterated that meaningful adversarial
testing is an integral part of the constitutional right to effective
assistance of counsel:
The right to the effective assistance of counsel is thus the
right of the accused to require the prosecution’s case to
survive the crucible of meaningful adversarial testing.
When a true adversarial criminal trial has been
conducted—even if defense counsel may have made
demonstrable errors—the kind of testing envisioned by the
Sixth Amendment has occurred. But if the process loses its
character as a confrontation between adversaries, the

21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
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Id. at 73.
Cuyler, 446 U.S. at 348.
Id. at 349–50.
Id. at 348–49.
Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 75–76 (1942).
United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 656 (1984).
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constitutional guarantee is violated.28
Thus, in the Sixth Amendment right-to-counsel context, the
showing required to establish a violation can vary with the
circumstances. When forensic evidence is at stake, the inquiry should
be altered as well. The inability to make an informed prejudice
determination is a theme that runs through Powell, Cuyler, and
Glasser, especially where there was a breakdown in the ability of a
defense attorney to effectively engage in a meaningful adversarial
testing of the government’s case.29 That these cases were decided
before Strickland does not alter the principle for which they stand,
namely, that where prejudice is difficult or impossible to determine,
the test for determining ineffective assistance of counsel should be
different. Where a defense attorney is deficient in failing to subject
incriminatory forensic science evidence to meaningful adversarial
testing, prejudice is likewise too difficult, if not impossible, of an
inquiry for courts to undertake.
When incriminating forensic science is used against a defendant at
trial the IAC inquiry should be different from that announced in
Strickland, especially given the rapidly growing importance of such
evidence within the criminal legal system and the complexities
inherent in the various forensic disciplines.30 Upon a finding that
counsel has been deficient in meaningfully combating incriminating
forensic science evidence, the reviewing court should reverse the
conviction without further inquiry into prejudice.

28. Id. at 656–57 (emphasis added).
29. See generally Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335 (1980); Glasser, 315 U.S. at 60; Powell v.
Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
30. This idea has been acknowledged and foretold elsewhere. For example, “The Supreme Court
may ultimately determine that when counsel fails to request a Daubert hearing or query forensic
evidence pre-trial, this dereliction is equally as damaging as failing to cross-examine experts at trial.”
Valena Beety, Changing the Culture of Disclosure and Forensics, 73 WASH. & LEE L. REV. ONLINE
580, 584 (2017). “The determination that counsel is effective, or not, is tied to ‘reasonableness under
prevailing professional norms,’ and those norms are changing.” Id.
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II. The Deficiency Prong Is Important
Courts, in determining whether defense counsel was deficient,
often look to the applicable practice guidelines and ethical
standards.31 In Wiggins v. Smith, the Supreme Court noted that the
standards articulated by the American Bar Association (ABA) are
“standards to which we long have referred as ‘guides to determining
what is reasonable.’”32 Then, in Rompilla v. Beard,33 the Supreme
Court quoted directly from the applicable ABA standards as a guide
for what is reasonable performance by an attorney:
It is the duty of the lawyer to conduct a prompt
investigation of the circumstances of the case and to
explore all avenues leading to facts relevant to the merits of
the case and the penalty in the event of conviction. . . . The
duty to investigate exists regardless of the accused’s
admissions or statements to the lawyer of facts constituting
guilt or the accused’s stated desire to plead guilty.34
Applying that standard to a case involving forensic science evidence,
then, defense counsel must inform themselves about and understand
the forensic evidence in their cases sufficiently to enable an effective
challenge.
The ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct, meanwhile,
require “competent representation,” defined as “the legal knowledge,
skill, thoroughness and preparation reasonably necessary for
representation.”35 Therefore, an attorney must acquire knowledge of
and skill in the relevant forensic science prior to a trial (or prior to
counseling a client to plead guilty) in order to provide competent
31. See, e.g., Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 524 (2003); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 396
(2000).
32. Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 524 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. 668, 688 (1984)); see also Williams, 529
U.S. at 396 (referencing the ABA Standards for Criminal Justice and accompanying commentary).
33. Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374, 387 (2005).
34. Id. (quoting STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE 4-4.1 (AM. BAR ASS’N 1993)) (emphasis
added).
35. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.1. (AM. BAR ASS’N 2015).
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representation.36 “In determining whether a lawyer employs the
requisite knowledge and skill in a particular matter, relevant factors
include . . . whether it is feasible to refer the matter to, or associate or
consult with, a lawyer of established competence in the field in
question.”37 This guideline explicitly provides another option to an
attorney who is too daunted by the notion of learning science to do so
himself or herself: associate with an attorney with the requisite
knowledge and experience to test the evidence in a meaningfully
adversarial way.38
As former federal judge Nancy Gertner implored, “Counsel have
to learn that advocacy in cases involving forensic evidence requires
familiarity with the kind of issues the National Academy of Sciences
(NAS) Report raised. And further, courts need to make it clear that
such familiarity may be one of the benchmarks in evaluating when
assistance of counsel is constitutionally ineffective.”39 This
imperative highlights the reasons why courts should be compelled to
review the alleged deficiency of attorneys in any cases involving
forensic science—doing so solidifies with the force of the law what is
mandated of lawyers and reminds both attorneys and judges of the
benchmarks against which to review attorney performance in the
future.40 Indeed, “Sixth Amendment right-to-counsel rulings may
increasingly cement the obligation of the defense to seek discovery
on forensics and to retain experts who can independently examine the
analysis conducted and opine on its reliability.”41
36. See id.
37. Id. at cmt. 1.
38. Id.
39. Nancy Gertner, Commentary on the Need for a Research Culture in the Forensic Sciences, 58
U.C.L.A. L. REV. 789, 792 (2011). Judge Gertner issued a standing order in her courtroom, which
provided that the admissibility of trace evidence “ought not to be presumed; that it has to be carefully
examined in each case, and tested in the light of the NAS concerns, the concerns of Daubert/Kumho,
and Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence.” Procedural Order: Trace Evidence at 3, No. 1:08-cr10104-NG (D. Mass. Mar. 8, 2010).
40. Gertner, supra note 39, at 792.
41. Brandon L. Garrett, The Crime Lab in the Age of the Genetic Panopticon, 115 MICH. L. REV.
979, 990 (2017). As the inquiry pertains to seeking and securing necessary discovery, the ABA
Standards for Criminal Justice: DNA Evidence (3d ed. 2007) provide an accessible guide for what
should, at a minimum, be expected of counsel. Analogues can be drawn from that guide to other forensic
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In the meantime, however, “a defense attorney could provide
effective assistance under the constitutional standard (Strickland) and
yet be incompetent under the ABA Model Rule because the latter
does not require a showing of prejudice.”42 This should not, and need
not, be the case when forensic science evidence is involved, and
Judge Gertner recognized as much.43 “While the constitutional
ineffective assistance of counsel standard under Strickland v.
Washington is notoriously low, the standard with respect to scientific
evidence should be different.”44 The deficient performance prong is
vital for courts to address when incriminating forensic science
evidence is at issue. If that prong is not satisfied, the deficiency alone
should suffice to constitutionally entitle a defendant whose liberty is
at stake to a new trial—at which the forensic science is subject to
meaningful adversarial testing.
III. Abandoning the Prejudice Prong
A. Judges Aren’t Scientists
Determining prejudice where defense counsel failed to
meaningfully test incriminating forensic evidence is a fanciful
endeavor. Judges are not scientists. A study conducted in 2001
concluded with resounding clarity that judges, as a whole, are not
institutionally equipped to make probative determinations regarding
forensic science.45 A survey of 400 judges revealed that 48%
believed that their education was insufficient to adequately prepare
them to deal with the range of scientific evidence proffered in their

disciplines.
42. Paul C. Gianelli et al., Forensic Experts and Ineffective Assistance of Counsel, 48 CRIM. L.
BULL. 1, 2 (2012).
43. Gertner, supra note 39, at 792.
44. Id. at 792–93; see also Neufeld, supra note 4, at S110 (“[T]he principal failing of Daubert is its
misplaced reliance on a robust adversarial system to expose bad science. In reality the playing field is
not level, and the system is anything but robust.”).
45. See Sophia I. Gatowski et al., Asking the Gatekeepers: A National Survey of Judges on Judging
Expert Evidence in a Post-Daubert World, 25 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 433, 442 (2001).
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courtrooms.46 Perhaps even more telling, however, was the following
finding:
Although the majority of judge–respondents reported
falsifiability to be useful when determining the merits of
proffered scientific evidence, the results clearly indicate
that most judges did not fully understand the scientific
meaning of this concept.
From the answers that were provided, the researchers could
only infer a true understanding of the scientific meaning of
falsifiability in 6% (n = 23 of 400) of the judge’s
responses.47
When asked to elaborate on the meaning of “falsifiability,” judicial
answers included, “I would want to know if the evidence was
falsified,” and “I would look at the results and determine if they are
false.”48 In fact, the concept of falsifiability has nothing to do with
the evidence or test results in a given case, but rather it asks a
threshold question of whether a given scientific theory is refutable or
testable.49
Meanwhile, only 4% of the judges who indicated that error rate
was a useful criterion for determining admissibility of proffered
scientific evidence had a true understanding of the concept of “error
rate.”50 Yet error rate was one of the factors Daubert explicitly

46.
47.
48.
49.

Id.
Id. at 444.
Id. at 445.
See, e.g., KARL POPPER, CONJECTURES AND REFUTATIONS: THE GROWTH OF SCIENTIFIC
KNOWLEDGE 48 (5th ed. 1989) (“[T]he criterion of the scientific status of a theory is its falsifiability, or
refutability, or testability.”). This explanation can be found in Daubert itself. See Daubert v. Merrell
Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 593 (1993) (“Ordinarily, a key question to be answered in determining
whether a theory or technique is scientific knowledge that will assist the trier of fact will be whether it
can be (and has been) tested.”).
50. Gatowski et al., supra note 45, at 447.
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determinations.51
The study concluded that:

in

making

905

admissibility

[A]lthough the judges confidently and overwhelmingly
responded that the Daubert criteria were useful decisionmaking guides, the majority did not seem to recognize or
acknowledge their lack of understanding about how to
apply some of the guidelines as part of the admissibility
decision-making process.
This is an important finding. Judges’ difficulty
operationalizing the Daubert criteria, especially
falsifiability and error rate, suggests limitations in the
judiciary’s understanding of science.52
These findings are hardly surprising; judges, after all, are nonscientists who are expected to efficiently handle diverse and
demanding caseloads. But if trial judges do not know science, what
makes a reviewing judge any more knowledgeable? And if a
reviewing judge does not know science any better, then how can such
a judge weigh the incriminating forensic science evidence against an
ineffective science-based challenge to arrive at a reliable probative
determination as to prejudice? Moreover, because the inquiry is
within the context of an IAC claim, judges may be attempting to
make this prejudice determination from a deficiently-developed
record.
Further complicating the inquiry is the “CSI Effect,” that is, “the
idea that certain television programs . . . along with high-profile cases
involving DNA tests, fiber analysis, and fingerprinting databases,
51. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 594. Indeed, error and uncertainty are complicated yet crucial concepts to
understand in order to ensure the accuracy of forensic evidence. See generally Ted Vosk, Uncertain
Justice Measurement: Uncertainty and the Discovery of Truth in the Courtroom, 54 JUDGES’ J. 8, 8–11,
39 (2015).
52. Gatowski et al., supra note 45, at 452–53.
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ha[ve] led members of the public to believe that forensic evidence
[is] both widely available and almost infallible.”53 Although the
extent to which this effect has a bearing on a given case may be
debatable,54 its presence hovers over all trials involving forensic
evidence: from attorney voir dire to jury deliberation to judicial
decision-making. This additional intangible factor is inaccessible to a
reviewing judge’s prejudice inquiry.
B. Unjust Results
A reviewing court should not be the institution entrusted to make
the critical prejudice inquiry when there has been a deficient
challenge to forensic science; reviewing judges are ill-suited to that
task when incriminating forensic science evidence is at issue.
Consider again the CSI effect briefly mentioned above.
Conservatively interpreted, the CSI effect suggests that jurors will
have preconceived notions, one way or the other, when confronted
with forensic science evidence.55 Some may treat it as infallible,
others may be suspicious. But what we do know for certain is that
people are wrongfully convicted because of the misapplication of
forensic science.56 If jurors wrongfully convict people based on
faulty forensic science (which they do), and if judges do not
understand how forensic science—faulty or not, adequately tested or
not—affects juries (which they do not), then why are judges relied on
to determine how (hypothetically) accurate and (hypothetically)

53. ADAM BENFORADO, UNFAIR: THE NEW SCIENCE OF CRIMINAL INJUSTICE 149 (2015).
54. See, e.g., Kimberlianne Podlas, The CSI Effect: Exposing the Media Myth, 16 FORDHAM INTELL.
PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 429, 465 (2006) (“If anything, the data hints that, if there is any effect of CSI,
it is to exalt the infallibility of forensic evidence, favor the prosecution, or pre-dispose jurors toward
findings of guilt.”); Donald E. Shelton et al., A Study of Juror Expectations and Demands Concerning
Scientific Evidence: Does the “CSI Effect” Exist?, 9 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 331, 359–61 (2006)
(finding that in cases charging rape or sexual misconduct, as well as in circumstantial evidence cases,
jurors were more inclined to require scientific evidence to convict).
55. Shelton, supra note 54, at 359–61.
56. According to data maintained by the Innocence Project, “[m]isapplication of forensic science is
the second most common contributing factor to wrongful convictions . . . .” Misapplication of Forensic
Science, INNOCENCE PROJECT, https://www.innocenceproject.org/causes/misapplication-forensicscience/ [https://perma.cc/4FJQ-QXUU] (last visited July 8, 2018).
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adequately-tested forensic science evidence would or would not
affect the outcome of a case?
Practical experience demonstrates that the requirement of a
prejudice inquiry under these circumstances produces unjust results.57
One study revealed that of cases involving exonerations following
trials at which erroneous forensic evidence was presented, “[d]efense
counsel rarely made any objections to the invalid forensic science
testimony in these trials and rarely effectively cross-examined
forensic analysts who provided invalid science testimony.”58 These
were exonerations, not IAC reversals. After all, “It is typical in
litigation of ineffective assistance of counsel claims, for courts to
find that any failures by counsel did not prejudice the defense,
including by citing to seemingly ‘overwhelming’ evidence of
guilt.”59
A stark example of the reluctance of courts to find prejudice,
notwithstanding deficient performance, is found in Hinton v.
Alabama.60 There, the Supreme Court, in a per curiam opinion, found
that the “trial attorney’s failure to request additional funding in order
to replace an expert he knew to be inadequate because he mistakenly
believed that he had received all he could get under Alabama law
constituted deficient performance.”61 Mr. Hinton had been sentenced
to death after being convicted largely on the basis of firearms and
toolmark evidence; the defense expert had only one eye, and thus had
difficulty using the forensic microscope during his examination.62
However, this deficient performance alone was not enough to get Mr.
Hinton off of death row.63 Rather, the Court remanded the case to
57. See Brandon L. Garrett, Constitutional Regulation of Forensic Evidence, 73 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. 1147, 1175 (2016).
58. Brandon L. Garrett & Peter J. Neufeld, Invalid Forensic Science Testimony and Wrongful
Convictions, 95 VA. L. REV. 1, 89 (2009).
59. Garrett, supra note 57, at 1175.
60. See generally Hinton v. Alabama, 134 S. Ct. 1081 (2014).
61. Id. at 1088. The Court balked at finding too much deficiency, noting that “the inadequate
assistance of counsel we find in this case does not consist of the hiring of an expert who, though
qualified, was not qualified enough.” Id. at 1089.
62. Id. at 1085–86.
63. Alan Blinder, Alabama Man on Death Row for Three Decades Is Freed As State’s Case Erodes,
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determine whether the deficient performance prejudiced the
defense.64 Mr. Hinton was later exonerated, but not because any court
found prejudice.65 Rather, the case was dismissed by a trial judge
after prosecutors conceded that no match could be made between the
recovered bullets and the gun.66 No court-conducted prejudice
inquiry ever resulted in a judicial determination that Mr. Hinton’s
deficient representation prejudiced him—an innocent man convicted
and sentenced to death because of inadequate adversarial testing of
otherwise incriminating forensic evidence.
Would Mr. Hinton have been exonerated had a proper prejudice
inquiry been made? Not necessarily, which gets to the crux of the
matter. Consistent with Strickland, a reviewing court could find that
there was no “reasonable probability”67 that the outcome would have
been different if another, albeit more qualified, expert had been used.
That is precisely what the Supreme Court foretold in its Hinton
decision: “We do not today launch federal courts into examination of
the relative qualifications of experts hired and experts that might
have been hired.”68 To be fair, that statement was made in the context
of a deficiency analysis.69 But once asserted, it carries equal—if not
more—force in a subsequent prejudice determination. If courts are
instructed not to second guess whether a lawyer was deficient for
hiring an inadequate expert, then a fortiori such a decision could not
be prejudicial under Strickland. Yet in Hinton, it clearly was.

N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 3, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/04/us/anthony-ray-hinton-alabamaprison-freed-murder.html [https://perma.cc/BYK2-YSA5].
64. Hinton, 134 S. Ct. at 1090.
65. Blinder, supra note 63.
66. See generally Anthony Hinton Exonerated After 30 Years on Death Row, EQUAL JUST.
INITIATIVE, https://eji.org/anthony-ray-hinton-exonerated-from-alabama-death-row
[https://perma.cc/TZL3-T448] (last visited July 8, 2018).
67. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694 (1984).
68. Hinton, 134 S. Ct. at 1089.
69. Id.
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IV. Presuming Prejudice
Once a reviewing court deems defense counsel constitutionally
deficient for failing to subject incriminating forensic science
evidence to meaningful adversarial testing,70 prejudice should be
presumed and a new trial ordered. Forensic evidence has become an
indispensable field for criminal defense practitioners to tackle.
“Criminal cases will arise where the only reasonable and available
defense strategy requires consultation with experts or introduction of
expert evidence, whether [at] pretrial, at trial, or both.”71 This is
especially so in the most serious of criminal cases—homicides, sex
offenses, armed felonies—that carry the harshest of punishments—
life in prison, life without parole, or even death. In such cases,
“defense lawyers must be aware that prosecutors may put fairly
unreliable forensic evidence on the stand, and at trial courts have
traditionally permitted even invalid or overstated forensics.”72
Unreliable forensic science evidence has been uniquely successful at
convicting the innocent.73 Where the requisite adversarial testing of
such evidence is absent, confidence in the outcome is undermined.74
Consider the case mentioned at the outset.75 The Frye motion
having been perfunctorily denied, the inculpatory results of the FST
program will soon be admitted at trial. Counsel then faces a variety
of choices, the following of which are neither exhaustive nor
mutually exclusive: concede the reliability of the results and argue
that the presence of DNA is not incriminating (because of innocent
presence or secondary transfer, for instance); present evidence and
argue that the admissibility ruling notwithstanding, the underlying
validity of the software is not sufficiently established to be trusted; or
argue that the results are just wrong, because in this instance the
software or the analyst simply made a mistake. Defense counsel
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
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might pursue these theories via cross-examination, the presentation
of a defense expert, or both.
Where counsel does none of that before the jury, or does so little as
to render deficient assistance, how can a court possibly be situated to
reliably determine that an effective attorney would not have achieved
a different outcome?76 Undertaking this inquiry requires answering a
host of questions reviewing courts are ill-suited to address. In the
case involving FST, for example, how would the jury have responded
to an attack on the foundational validity of the software?77 Or, an
attack on the validity as applied?78 What if the defense attorney had
exposed the prosecution as having fallen into the trap of the
“Prosecutor’s Fallacy,”79 or explained the “Swamping Effect”?80
Under these circumstances, a reviewing court cannot reliably or
realistically opine on what an adequate adversarial attack on the
forensic evidence “might disclose as to the facts.”81
Maybe the attorney attempted some cross-examination; does that
make the reviewing court’s job easier? Some scientists think not. “If
cross-examination is to be the only way to discover misleading or

76. Regardless of the extent to which evidence is presented in post-trial proceedings in an attempt to
create a record demonstrating prejudice, the courts, to determine prejudice, must still engage in
guesswork built upon speculation. Pre-trial and mid-trial rulings determine the admissibility of evidence,
which affects which witnesses are or are not called, which affects the arguments that are made, all of
which bear upon the ultimate outcome, with counsel refining and reconsidering strategy all along.
Moreover, there are valuable reasons to engage in a deficiency analysis when reviewing all forensic
science IAC cases, as discussed in section III, supra.
77. “Foundational validity” is the “scientific standard corresponding to the legal standard of
evidence being based on ‘reliable principles and methods.’” PCAST Report, supra note 15, at 43.
78. “Validity as applied” is the “scientific standard corresponding to the legal standard of an expert
having ‘reliably applied the principles and methods.’” PCAST Report, supra note 15, at 43.
79. See generally William C. Thompson & Edward L. Schumann, Interpretation of Statistical
Evidence in Criminal Trials: The Prosecutor’s Fallacy and the Defense Attorney’s Fallacy, 11 L. &
HUM. BEHAV. 167, 171–72 (1987). The “Prosecutor’s Fallacy” occurs when a prosecuting attorney, in
the presentation of evidence or argument, “transposes the conditional” and argues that the probability
that a given DNA profile came from someone other than the defendant is equivalent to the likelihood
ratio produced by the DNA analysis. PETER GILL, MISLEADING DNA EVIDENCE: REASONS FOR
MISCARRIAGES OF JUSTICE 18 (2014).
80. The “Swamping Effect” occurs when the fact-finder disproportionately discounts exculpatory
non-scientific evidence due to a very high—sometimes into the billions or more—likelihood ratio
connecting DNA (or other scientific) evidence to the defendant. Gill, supra note 79, at 105.
81. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 58 (1932).
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inadequate testimony by forensic scientists, then too much is being
expected from it.”82
Another commentator rejects, almost out of hand, the
argument that “the searing test of a rigorous crossexamination” is a sufficient safeguard in this context. He
writes: “All that one can say to such an argument is that the
lawyers who make it should know better, and, if they do
know better, as they must if they are experienced trial
lawyers, they should have more conscience than to
perpetuate such a myth.”83
Some judges agree as well.84 “[E]xperience has shown that, at least
in criminal trials, the suggestion that the ‘adversarial system’
represents an adequate means of demonstrating the unreliability of
forensic evidence is mostly fanciful.”85 As Judge Gertner, a former
trial-level federal judge who presided over trials that included expert
testimony, observed, “The best cross-examiner, with the best skills in
the usual driving-under-the-influence case, may not be up to par
when complex forensic evidence is involved.”86
If even an experienced defense attorney’s cross-examination may
not be sufficient to effectively demonstrate the invalidity of proffered
forensic evidence, reliance on the role of cross-examination to ferret
out unreliable science—particularly ineffective cross-examination
and what a reviewing judge speculates a more effective cross may or
may not have accomplished—is misplaced. Faced with this reality,
courts are not equipped to make reliable prejudice determinations
82. Paul C. Giannelli, Defense Experts and the Myth of Cross-Examination, 30 CRIM. JUST. 46, 47
(2016) (quoting Douglas M. Lucas, The Ethical Responsibilities of the Forensic Scientist: Exploring the
Limits, 34 J. FORENSIC SCI. 719, 724 (1989)).
83. Paul C. Giannelli & Sarah Antonucci, Forensic Experts and Ineffective Assistance of Counsel, 48
CRIM. L. BULL. 1, 4 (2012) (quoting Barton Ingraham, The Ethics of Testimony: Conflicting Views on
the Role of the Criminologist as Expert Witness, in EXPERT WITNESS 178, 183 (Patrick R. Anderson &
L. Thomas Winfree, Jr. eds., 1987)).
84. Edwards & Mnookin, supra note 5.
85. Id.
86. Gertner, supra note 39, at 793.
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when reviewing claims that a defense attorney was deficient in
combating incriminating forensic science evidence. Prejudice review
simply becomes a matter of “garbage in, garbage out.” That is,
untested, unreliable forensic evidence comes in at trial; the reviewing
court justifies the conviction because the defendant has not satisfied
the stringent Strickland prejudice standard; and that same untested
unreliable forensic evidence remains in place to sustain the
conviction.
The concern, made clear by wrongful convictions caused by faulty
forensics, is that some doubt about the integrity of the forensic
evidence or the reliability of the incriminating science typically is not
sufficient for courts to find prejudice in the IAC context.87 Reviewing
courts conclude either that: (1) the non-scientific evidence proves the
defendant is guilty (resulting in no IAC prejudice) or (2) the science
proves the defendant is innocent (resulting in an exoneration).
Anything short of (2) is enough, under Strickland, to justify
sustaining the conviction. But those two polar opposites should not
comprise the breadth of review that criminal convictions receive
when based on forensic science evidence, particularly where the
defense challenge to such evidence has been deemed deficient.88
Rather, applying the presumption of innocence, burden of proof, and
standard of proof at play in criminal prosecutions, the defense may
rightfully prevail in a criminal case by raising doubts about whether
the forensic science evidence is foundationally valid, was validly
applied, or should otherwise be trusted. Without accounting for the
unique role that forensic science evidence plays in the criminal legal
system—its power to convict unjustly, its ability to exonerate rightly,
and the foreignness of its underlying scientific principles (or lack
thereof) to the non-scientist judicial officers presiding—the prejudice
inquiry in the forensic evidence context does not do its job. As a
87. See Garrett, supra note 57, at 1175.
88. See, e.g., In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 372 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring) (“I view the
requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt in a criminal case as bottomed on a fundamental value
determination of our society that it is far worse to convict an innocent man than to let a guilty man go
free.”).
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result, courts should presume prejudice where defense counsel is
deficient in meaningfully confronting incriminating forensic science.
CONCLUSION
“The Sixth Amendment stands as a constant admonition that if the
constitutional safeguards it provides be lost, justice will not still be
done.”89 “The right to have the assistance of counsel is too
fundamental and absolute to allow courts to indulge in nice
calculations as to the amount of prejudice arising from its denial.”90
Calling on non-scientist judges to try to make reliable hypothetical
prejudice calculations about the impact of forensic science is a fool’s
errand. Such inquiry should be abandoned in the context of IAC
claims for failure to adequately test incriminating forensic science
evidence.
There need be no fear that the floodgates will open to presuming
prejudice in the context of other IAC claims. Forensic science
evidence is unique for at least three reasons. First, it simultaneously
has been the cause of wrongful convictions and exonerations of the
innocent for almost three decades.91 Thus, forensic evidence merits
heightened scrutiny when it contributes to a criminal conviction.
Second, judges are not scientists; they should not be relied upon to
make reliable judgments about the impact a sophisticated scientific
method may or may not have had on the outcome of a trial. Third, as
the NAS Report and President’s Council of Advisors on Science and
Technology Report make clear, forensic disciplines long deemed
valid have been and continue to be exposed as fraught with error.
Forensic science evidence plays a vital role within the criminal
legal system, a system that is staffed predominantly by people who
89. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 343 (1963) (quoting Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 462
(1938)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
90. Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 76 (1942).
91. DNA
Exonerations
in
the
United
States,
INNOCENCE
PROJECT,
https://www.innocenceproject.org/dna-exonerations-in-the-united-states/
[https://perma.cc/8APDRBXB] (last visited Feb. 12, 2018). At least 353 people have been exonerated in the United States
thanks to DNA evidence. Id.
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are not scientists. To ensure the Sixth Amendment guarantee to
effective assistance of counsel is satisfied in all cases, courts should
require that defense attorneys effectively subject incriminating
forensic science evidence to the “crucible of meaningful adversarial
testing.”92 If an attorney is deficient in that regard, prejudice should
be presumed. Short of that the Sixth Amendment is violated, and the
integrity of a criminal conviction remains in doubt.

92. United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 656 (1984).
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